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According to [Botelho and Coelho 1998a, 1998b] emotion plays an important role at the control
level of emotion systems. Essentially, emotion may lead to reflexive behaviors, to the creation or
intensification of motivators, and to set new criteria for plan selection. Emotion is a sequential,
possibly iterative process that comprises appraisal stages, signal generation stages and
emotion-responses. In this paper, we argue that adaptive behavior may be achieved through a
process of emotion learning. We point out three ways in which an agent can improve its emotion
processes and therefore become more adaptive: learning new affective appraisal rules, learning
new emotion-signals, and learning new emotion-responses.
1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss emotion in the perspective
of the Salt & Pepper Project. The goal of the project
is to develop and evaluate computer agent
architectures for general intelli gence. The approach
taken in the Salt & Pepper Project is to build
mechanisms and features that can play the same
roles for artificial agents as those responsible for the
success of natural agents, notably human beings. In
particular we have taken inspiration in cognitive
science and in neuroscience.
Emotion has been identified as one of the key
elements of the intelli gence and of the adaptive
nature of human beings [Damásio 1994][Goleman
1995], therefore we want to develop artificial
mechanisms that can play the role emotion plays in
natural li fe. We call this mechanisms “artificial
emotions”.
Since we are dealing with artificial emotions, the
psychologically inclined reader should not be
surprised to find out that our project addresses
emotions that do not forcefully match the usual
natural emotions, such as joy and relief.
Although this is not the same as modeling
emotions, the architectures and the agents developed
within the Salt & Pepper Project provide an
information-processing view of the integration of
cognitive models and neuroscience theories.
The main contributions of this paper is to argue
that emotion learning is a valid approach to improve
the behavior of artificial autonomous agents, and to
present a systematic view of the kinds of emotion
learning that can take place, assuming emotion is a
process involving appraisal, emotion-signal
generation and emotion-response.
In the field of Artificial Autonomous Agents, the
mainstream research on emotion is driven by the
believable agents community. In that community
emotion is viewed as a way of improving the
believabilit y of artificial agents. Joseph Bates and
the Oz project [Bates et al 1992] are specially
concerned with interactive drama characters. Clark
Elli ott and the Affective Reasoning Project [Elli ott
1994, 1998] aim at improving the agent’s
performance at the task level. They have shown that
emotion can improve the way information is created,
conveyed and understood. This research goal is also
shared by other authors such as [Numao et al. 1997]
in which emotion is used to improve the
music-arrangement capabiliti es of an intelli gent
system. Emotion has also been used as a way to
improve interface agents and, more recently, avatars
[Vilhjálmsson and Cassell 1998].
Some other researchers such as Dolores
Cañamero [Cañamero 1997], Luís Botelho and
Helder Coelho [Botelho and Coelho 1996a, 1998a,
1998b] and Aaron Sloman and the Cognition and
Affect Project [Sloman 1987] [Beaudoin and
Sloman 1993] have presented some work showing
that emotion should be considered at the level of the
agent architecture.
Emotions play important roles at the
control-level of agent architectures: emotion may
lead to reflexive behavior, it may intensify the
motivation of an agent, it can create new motivators
(e.g., new goals) and it can set new criteria for the
selection of the methods and the plans the agent uses
to satisfy its motives.
Since emotion is a process that operates at the
level of control of an agent architecture, the
behavior of the agent will i mprove if the emotion
process of the agent improves. In this paper we
explore this possibilit y. Namely, we explore the
ways an agent can improve its emotion-processes. In
section 2, we present the process view of emotion. In
section 3, we relate the process view of emotion with
three classes of emotion learning processes: learning
appraisal structures, learning new emotion-signals,
learning emotion-responses. Section 4 presents some
conclusions and final remarks.
2. A process view of emotion
Within the Salt & Pepper Project, emotion is seen as
a sequential, possibly iterative process that
comprises appraisal stages, signal generation stages
and emotion-responses. The global state of the agent
is appraised, an emotion-signal may be generated
and some behavior is possibly performed in
response to the signal generated. This behavior may,
in turn, change the agent’s global state which will be
appraised again and a new signal may be generated.
This process goes on and on repeatedly.
In the remaining of section 2, we will explain
each of these stages in some detail.
2.1 Affective appraisal
In the appraisal stage of emotion, the global state of
the agent (i.e., its internal state and the external
environment) is evaluated with respect to the
satisfaction of its motivation structures (e.g.,
instincts, goals, values and attitudes). The goal of
the appraisal stage is to determine if and how the
global state of the agent impairs or facilit ates the
satisfaction of its motivators.
The mainstream view of emotion in artificial
autonomous agents has focused on cognitive
appraisal. For instance, the Affective Reasoning
Project [Elli ott 1994] proposes that emotion
involves a cognitive appraisal step in which a set of
appraisal frames is used to create the agent’s
interpretation of the situation. This interpretation is
represented as a set of Emotion Eliciting Condition
Relations (EECR). Than, the left hand side of
emotion eliciting productions is matched against the
EECRs. Whenever a match is found the
corresponding production fires, generating an
emotion. This process has two important
characteristics. First, more than one emotion may be
generated; second, the emotion generated depends
on the agent’s interpretation of the situation, not on
the actual situation. This later property is thus
responsible for context-dependent emotions.
The Salt & Pepper Project has been more
concerned with affective appraisal [Botelho and
Coelho 1998b] than with cognitive appraisal. The
affective appraisal is performed by the affective
engine of the architecture, whereas the cognitive
appraisal is performed by the cognitive engine. The
distinction between the cognitive and the affective
engines has an architectural basis [Botelho and
Coelho 1998b]. Interestingly, this distinction has
also been confirmed by neurological data and
theories [Damásio 1994] [Goleman 1995]
[Balkenius and Morén 1998]. For instance, the
amygdala has been found to be responsible for many
affective phenomena, whereas the visual cortex has
been found to maintain cognitive representations of
the environment.
In the Salt & Pepper Project we have been using
production rules to implement the affective appraisal
component of the emotion process. However, we
want to stress that the use of production rules does
not mean the appraisal process is a cognitive
process. In this respect, production systems are only
a computational tool, not a philosophical stance. The
main difference between the cognitive engine and
the affective engine is not the nature of the
processing [Sloman 1987]. The main difference is
the purpose of the processing, the kind of
information that is processed, and the typical
reaction time [Botelho and Coelho 1998b].
Some of the rules used in the affective appraisal
are directly programmed into the agent, other rules
may be learned in a number of ways (sections 3.1.1,
3.1.3 and 3.2) and yet some other rules result of rule
compilation processes (section 3.1.2).
During the affective appraisal, explicit
comparisons between the motives of the agent and
its global state are avoided. Explicit comparisons
involve long chains of rules which is incompatible
with the demanding time constraints that are
imposed by the dynamic environment on the agents
that inhabit it . Instead of the long chains of appraisal
rules required by explicit comparisons, the affective
appraisal process tends to use single heuristic rules
that implicitly determine how the global state of the
agent impairs or facilit ates the satisfaction of its
motives. Figure 1 shows a naive example that
ill ustrates the difference between the explicit and the
implicit use of the motives of an agent in the
affective appraisal stage of the emotion process.
The small appraisal production in Figure 1(b)
may be the result of a compilation process applied to
the rules in Figure 1(a), as described in section
3.1.2. We suspect that, in natural emotion, some of
these compilation processes are the result of
evolution of the species, while others reflect the
adaptation of the individual organism to its
environment.
The appraisal rule of Figure 1(b) means that if
someone has lost some money, a negative emotion
of fear is activated by an amount that is a certain
function of the loss.
It is clear from this example that the affective
engine of the agent architecture must have access to
at least a limited region of the agent episodic
memory, since it must have the information
regarding what has happened to it. The rule of the
example must have access to the episodic memory
representation of the fact that the agent has lost some
money.
Another important point with respect to affective
appraisal: the features extracted by the “affective
sensors” from the external environment are different
and more restricted than the features extracted by the
“cognitive sensors” . This heuristic option enables
faster processing times and therefore faster
reactions.
2.2 Emotion-signals
In certain conditions, the affective appraisal stage
generates signals that are intended to inform the
agent that certain measures must be taken so that its
global state may evolve in adaptive ways, that is, in
ways that are consistent with the motives of the
agent. These signals are called emotion-signals. In
the Salt & Pepper Project we have been dealing with
several classes of emotion-signals, such as
attention-shift warnings, performance-evaluation
signals, malfunctioning-component warnings,
motivation intensifiers [Botelho and Coelho 1996a,
1998a, 1998b] and communication modulation
signals.
Attention-shift warnings signal the agent that its
attention should shift from its current cognitive task
to something else. For instance, the agent should
suspend its current cognitive task and pay attention
to the external environment.
Performance-evaluation signals are used to tell
the agent that it has been performing well or poorly.
Maybe the agent should consider selecting another
algorithm for its current task.
Malfunctioning-component warnings signal the
agent that some component of its architecture is not
working properly. Malfunctioning-component
warnings are different from performance evaluation
signals since the former have an identification
function whereas the later have an evaluation
function. However, signals of these two kinds may
come together, since a malfunctioning component
may be the cause of poor performance.
Motivation intensifiers inform the agent that its
current motivation should be increased (decreased).
Computationally, this means that more (less)
processing resources should be assigned to some
task. The agent information processing mechanism
may disable interrupts sent to a specific task, it may
increase the time slice or the processing priority
assigned to it and, in distributed environments, it
may assign more or faster processors to the task.
Communication modulation signals detect
opportunities for the agent to initiate a
communication (or a conversation turn) with some
other agent, or identify the non-linguistic, emotional
content of the communication.
Some of the emotion-signals are directly
programmed into the agent, others may be learned as
described in section 3.2.
2.3 Emotion-response
When an emotion-signal is generated it is sent to the
behavioral system of the agent. In certain conditions,
the behavioral system reacts to the emotion-signal
selecting some overt or covert behavior. Sometimes,
a reflexive (overt or covert) behavior is performed.
A robot may suddenly stop, an agent may initiate the
rationalization of some event. Other times, the
behavioral system responds to the emotion-signal,
creating a motivator that will condition the future
behavior of the agent. Consider an agent that needs
to get two files from a remote host using ftp. While
it is getting the first file, the agent receives a
performance evaluation signal saying the
transmission rate is very high. Upon receiving the
positive performance evaluation signal, the agent
Explicit comparison with the survival instinct (Figure 1, a)
if someone risks dying, he or she will feel a lot of fear;
risks_dying(A, Risk) ⇒ activate(fear, negative, Risk)
if someone risks running out of food, he or she risks dying;
risks_running_out_of_food(A, Risk) ⇒ risks_dying(A, f1(Risk))
if someone risks running out of money, he or she risks running out of food;
risks_running_out_of_money(A, Risk) ⇒ risks_running_out_of_food(A, f2(Risk))
if someone loses some amount of money, he or she risks running out of money
loses_money(A, Loss) ⇒ risks_running_out_of_money(A, f3(Loss))
Implicit comparison with the survival instinct (Figure 1, b)
loses_money(A, Loss) ⇒ activate(fear, negative, f1(f2(f3(Loss))))
Figure 1 - Affective appraisal rules
may create the goal of getting the second file as soon
as it finishes getting the first one. Another way the
behavioral system may react to an emotion-signal is
by setting new plan-selection criteria. For instance,
upon receiving a negative performance evaluation
signal (as a result of being bumped by another
robot), the behavioral system of the agent may set a
plan selection criteria that leads the robot to select
plans of action that contain regular planned
monitoring of the environment.
For each emotion-signal there may be more than
just one emotion-response, but when an
emotion-signal is generated, at most one
emotion-response will be selected and executed.
Emotion-responses may be directly programmed
into the agent, they may also be improved as
discussed in section 3.3.1, and they may be learned
as described in section 3.3.2.
2.4 Emotion in the Salt & Pepper architecture
In the Salt & Pepper architecture for autonomous
agents, the global state of the agent (external
environment plus internal state) are appraised by a
set of affective appraisal rules. If the global state
matches the left hand side of an adequate appraisal
rule, an emotion signal is generated. The emotion
signal is used as an input to the Behavioral System.
This system is a network of behaviors, each one with
some amount of activation. There may be more than
one behavior that match the generated
emotion-signal, but only the most activated one may
be selected and executed. Therefore, the exact
behavior of the agent when an emotion signal is
generated, depends on the pattern of activation of
the behavioral network that makes up its behavioral
system. This means that the agent may behave
differently in the presence of identical external
situations.
This context-dependent emotion mechanism
doesn’t involve the symbolic processing required by
the construal step in the approach of Elliott et. al.
[Elliott 1994], it just depends on the current pattern
of activation of the behavioral system of the agent.
Figure 2 summarizes the emotion process as
described in this section. The cognitive loop of the
agent (not fully represented in the figure) runs in
parallel with the emotion loop. The main concern of
the paper is the emotion loop, but some references
will also be made to the cognitive component of the
agent architecture.
3. Emotion learning
Emotion learning refers to the improvement of the
agent’s emotion process itself . Since emotion is one
of the agent’s control processes, improved emotion
entails improved behavior.
Following the process view of emotion described
in section 2, there are three main classes of emotion
learning: improving and learning appraisal rules
(i.e., the rules used in the appraisal stage), learning
new emotion-signals, and learning or improving
emotion-responses.
3.1 Improving and learning affective appraisal
rules
An agent may improve its affective appraisal process
in three ways. It may learn new global circumstances
(external environment and internal state) in which a
given emotion-signal should be generated; it may
compile a long chain of appraisal rules into a single
appraisal production; and it may change the
characteristics of the signal that is generated in given
global circumstances.
3.1.1 Learning new signal-triggering
circumstances
Suppose the agent finds itself in an undesired
situation. Suppose also the agent knows that what is
undesirable in that situation is the fact that Q is true.
Then it would have been useful if an emotion-signal
were generated in a previous situation in which the
agent could have decided to follow a course of
action in which Q would not be true. In order for this
to be possible, the agent must be able to realize that
some situation is undesired; it must be able to
identify what exactly is undesirable in that situation;
and it must be able of determining the latest situation
in which a useful emotion-signal should have been
generated.
Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical recent history of
an agent. In that history, the situations in which
something could have gone different ways are called
choice points. Course 1 and course 2 are two
alternative courses of action. Currently, the agent is











in an undesired situation. Q is what makes it
undesirable. P is a specific emotion-signal.
• The current situation is undesirable because Q is
the case. Possibly, Q is a conjunction of
propositions, not an atomic proposition.
• In choice point cp5, all choices available to the
agent would have lead it to situations in which Q
is the case (that is, the agent would not have been
able to avoid Q).
• In choice point cp4, the agent might have
followed a course of action in which Q would not
have been believed. However this would have
been an uninformed choice, it could only have
been made by chance.
• In choice point cp3, if the agent believed P, than
it would know that Q would be true in case it
chooses course of action 1. Therefore, the agent
should believe P in situation cp3. Since the
generation of an emotion-signal and the reaction
of the agent take some time, P must be generated
in situation cp2, or in some situation before it.
• In choice point cp2, the agent could know that Q
would be a possibility.
• In choice point cp1, the agent would not have
means to predict that Q would be a possibility.
In summary, an useful emotion-signal (P, in the
example) should have been generated in situation
cp2.
Requirements for learning new signal-triggering
circumstances
1. A negative emotion-signal (R) must be generated
that informs the agent that the current situation is
not desirable (otherwise the agent must be able
to cognitively determine that fact).
2. An attribution mechanism that determines that
“Q being true” is what makes the situation
undesirable. This can be made by a process that
involves rationalization [Botelho and Coelho
1996b] and an explicit theory of affect, or by a
process that involves deduction and an explicit
theory of attribution.
3. An information processing mechanism that
determines that the signal P should have been
generated in situation cp2. This mechanism must
have access to the recent history of the agent’s
choices, that is, the episodic memory of the agent
must be available for this form of emotion
learning. The agent must learn that the
emotion-signal P must be generated in situations
of the same class of situation cp2.
4. When the behavioral system of the agent receives
the generated emotion-signal P, it must react by
enacting a behavior that avoids the course of
action 1, that is, a behavior aimed at avoiding Q.
In the Salt & Pepper architecture for autonomous
agents, this behavior could just create the goal
“avoid Q”.
5. When the emotion-signal R is generated, the
agent must react (or plan to react) by initiating
the attribution process described in 2 above (find
Q), and by determining the triggering situation
(find situation cp2) as described in 3 above.
Question
What component of the architecture should perform
processes number 2 and 3 above, the affective
engine or the cognitive engine?
After the agent has learned the new emotion process
described above, whenever it detects a situation of
the same class of situation cp2, its affective appraisal
rules will generate the emotion-signal P. When the
agent’s behavioral system receives the signal P, it
may react by creating the goal “avoid Q”. Then the
planning performed by the agent (whether implicitly
or explicitly) will see to it that Q is avoided. The
whole process is a form of adaptive behavior in
which the agent learns to avoid undesirable
situations.
3.1.2 Compilation of sequences of appraisal
rules
This is what happens when a sequence of rules like
those in Figure 1(a) is converted in a single rule like
the one in Figure 1(b). This can be achieved by a
rule compilation process similar to the chunking
process used in the SOAR architecture [Laird et al
1986].
When a situation is to be appraised, the affective
engine searches appraisal rules whose left hand side
is satisfied by the situation and whose right hand
side specifies the generation of an emotion-signal. If
the affective engine finds such a rule, the appraisal
stops and the specified emotion-signal is generated.
If the affective engine finds satisfied rules, but none
Figure 3 - An agent recent history






of them specifies the generation of an
emotion-signal, the affective engine selects one of
the satisfied rules (according to some conflict
resolution strategy, for instance the most specific
rule), creates a new record of fired rules (to be used
by the rule compilation process), records the
selected rule and executes the specified action. The
inference and the rule recording process proceed
until an emotion-signal is generated or until no more
rules are satisfied. If an emotion-signal is eventually
generated by this process, the record of fired rules is
handed to the rule compilation algorithm. The rule
compilation algorithm generates a new rule that is
asserted to the existing set of appraisal rules. The
assertion mechanism guarantees that rules that
generate emotion-signals are checked first by the
affective system when situations are appraised.
The mechanism just described is embedded in
the affective appraisal process itself, which does not
require the intervention of the cognitive engine.
3.1.3 Changing the characteristics of the
generated emotion-signal
The agent’s affective engine may generate two
different signals for the same situation if the agent
learns a new emotion-signal (section 3.2) and
associates it to a situation for which another
emotion-signal already exists. If this is the case, it
may be necessary to merge all possible
emotion-signals that could be generated in the same
situation into a single signal.
If it makes sense to generate both
emotion-signals in the same situation, then if
possible, the set of appraisal rules that give rise to
both signals should be replaced by a single
production that generates them both. This may
happen if it is not possible to merge both signals into
a single one and they both make sense.
If the emotion-signal that was learned latter is
preferred to the emotion-signal that was learned
earlier, then the rules that generate the signal learned
earlier should be removed, and conversely if the
signal learned earlier is preferred to the signal
learned later.
Finally, if the agent finds out that both signals
should be merged, than it must replace the appraisal
rules responsible for both signals by an appraisal
rule that generates the merged signal. This is
possible only if the signals are of the same class but
have different parameters. For instance, if one signal
is an attention-shift warning with intensity I1, and the
other signal is an attention-shift warning equal to the
first one except that its intensity is I2, then the
merged signal can be an attention-shift warning with
an intensity given by a linear combination of the
intensities of the original signals.
Requirements for learning signal merging
1. The first requirement is that the agent must be
capable of preferring one signal over another
one.
2. Another requirement is to determine the weights
assigned to the signals, in case they should be
linearly combined.
3. Both of the previous requirements can be met if
the affective engine of the agent evaluates the
results of generating each signal and keeps track
of the evaluations. Then, if one signal is much
better than the other, it would be preferred to the
other. If none of them is much better than the
other, they may be combined using their
evaluations as their weights in their linear
combination.
4. The evaluation of a signal should depend mainly
on the average evaluation of the
emotion-response they trigger, and also on the
availability and cost of their emotion-responses.
Question
Should this process be an automatic process
maintained by the affective engine, or should it
involve the cognitive engine as well? The evaluation
of an emotion-response may be performed by the
affective engine (by means of a performance
evaluation signal), the availability of the response
can only be made by the affective engine, and the
cost of the response may be estimated both by the
affective and the cognitive engines.
3.2 Increasing the repertoire of emotion-signals
An agent may improve its emotion-process by
increasing the repertoire of emotion signals that can
be fired when it appraises its global state. If an agent
learns a new emotion-signal, it must also learn the
circumstances in which the new signal should be
issued and the behaviors that might be triggered
should the new signal be generated.
It does not make sense to learn a new
emotion-signal for an emotion-response (overt or
covert) that does not exist, but it makes sense to
learn a new signal that leads to an existing
emotion-response that has been found to be
desirable in a given situation.
In the Salt & Pepper architecture for autonomous
agents, emotion-signals are matched against a
network of behaviors. Each behavior in the network
is represented by a node with a header that is used in
behavior selection operations. The behavior selected
is the first one whose header matches the
emotion-signal. Therefore, if the agent detects a
situation in which it would like a certain behavior to
be performed, then it must create a new
emotion-signal that matches the header of the
desired behavior. Then, it must create an affective
appraisal rule that generates the new signal in some
situation (for instance, in the situation in which the
agent would like the desired behavior to be enacted).
Requirements for learning new emotion-signals
1. The agent must be able of realizing that a certain
behavior (B) is desirable in a certain situation
(S). This can be done in two ways. First, when
the agent performs the behavior, its affective
engine generates a positive
performance-evaluation signal informing the
agent that the behavior is desirable. Second,
using hypothetical reasoning, the (cognitive
engine of the) agent concludes that a certain
behavior would be appropriate in situations of a
certain class.
2. Create an affective appraisal rule that generates a
signal that matches the header of the desired
behavior (B) in situations of the class of the
identified situation (S).
Questions
When should this learning process be executed?
What component of the agent architecture should be
responsible for it, the cognitive engine or the
affective engine?
3.3 Learning emotion-responses
The agent may learn new responses to the signals
that are generated by its affective appraisal system, it
may improve existing behavioral responses and it
may learn as a result of a response to an
emotion-signal.
3.3.1 Improving existing behavioral responses
When an emotion-signal is generated and passed on
to the agent’s behavioral system, it is possible that a
behavior is selected and executed. However, the
selected behavior may reveal inappropriate for the
situation at hand. In this case, the agent may learn to
improve the behavior selected by means of a
reinforcement learning mechanism, or it may
generate a new behavior from scratch and store it in
the behavioral system. This later case is analyzed in
section 3.3.2. In this section, we consider the case of
improving an existing emotion-response.
The main requirement for this class of emotion
learning is that the agent’s affective engine is
capable of generating negative
performance-evaluation signals whenever the
enacted behavior reveals inappropriate, and positive
performance-evaluation signals whenever the
selected behavior performs exceedingly well
(according to some criteria). In response to these
performance evaluation emotion-signals, the agent
should run a reinforcement learning algorithm to
improve the previously selected behavior.
3.3.2 Learning new responses
When an emotion-signal is generated and sent to the
agent’s behavioral system, it is possible that no
behavior is found that matches the signal generated
(maybe not because there is no such behavior in the
agent’s repertoire, but because the resources
assigned to find it were not enough). In this case, the
emotion-signal is generated but the agent doesn’t do
anything because no behavior is selected.
If the agent comes to realize that it should have
done something, then it can first determine what
should have been achieved by an useful action (this
is a goal in terms of most agent and planning
architectures); and second, how this could be
achieved (that is, what actions should be performed).
The later is the classic planning problem, the former
is a decision problem. Either the execution of the
plan of action or the creation of the goal to be
achieved can be suitable responses to the generated
emotion-signal. The agent may chose one or the
other according to the features of the situation and
depending on whether or not it has actually built the
plan of action the time it realizes that something
should have been done. Goal creation behaviors are
more flexible strategies, but result in slower overt
reaction (it requires that some kind of planning be
done on the fly). Reflexive action is less flexible but
is faster.
Once the agent has determined the response to
the generated emotion-signal, it must add this new
behavior to its repertoire and associate it to the
emotion-signal that was generated. In terms of the
Salt & Pepper architecture for autonomous agents,
this means to create a new node with this new
behavior and store it in its behavioral network. The
header of this new node must match the
emotion-signal that was generated and left
unanswered.
Requirements for learning new
emotion-responses
1. The agent must be able of recognizing that an
emotion-signal was generated and no behavioral
response was produced. This is an easy to solve
architecture dependent problem.
2. The agent must be able of realizing that
something should have been done in response to
the generated emotion-signal. As usual, this can
be achieved in two ways. First, the fact that the
generated emotion-signal was not “attended”
may be noticed by the affective engine and
another signal may be generated. Second, the
agent may cognitively recognize this need.
3. The agent must have some decision making and
some kind of planning capabilities.
3.3.3 Learning as a result of a response to an
emotion-signal
When the emotion-response of the agent to some
emotion-signal is an adaptive learning process, the
agent improves its behavior as a result of executing
the response to the emotion-signal. Therefore this is
not a case of emotion learning, thus it will not be
considered in detail in this paper. This is a case in
which emotion leads the agent to improve its
behavior. In principle, any learning algorithm can be
triggered as a response to an emotion-signal. Just to
mention a few possibilities, the agent may trigger a
rationalization process that explains why some event
has happened and learn to avoid the causes of the
undesirable situation (or to try to achieve them, in
case of a desirable situation), it may also mark some
decision or action selection rules as “bad rules in
some context”, and it may set new criteria for plan
selection that avoids interruptions (and hence, avoid
experiencing new negative emotions). It is worth
noting that this later form of learning corresponds to
the proposal of Herbert Simon presented in [Simon
1967].
3.4 Summary of emotion learning processes
In section 3, we have described seven emotion
learning processes that belong to three major classes
according to the stage of the emotion process that is
improved. Table 1 summarizes all the seven
processes described.
In most cases, the main architectural requirement
for an emotion learning process to be possible is that
situations, events and behaviors are detected and
evaluated, which is one of the roles of the emotion
process itself. In some cases however, the cognitive
engine is also required for emotion learning. This is
what may happen, for instance, when the agent has
to perform attributions (section 3.1.1), make
decisions (section 3.3.2), or figure out plans of
action (section 3.3.2).
4. Conclusions and final remarks
Our work on artificial emotion suggests some
answers to some questions regarding autonomy,
emotion and cognition interplay, and affective
systems synthesis.
First, it shows that the creation of new motivators
(e.g., goals) may result from the emotion process
(actually, the emotion response). This is part of the
answer to a repeatedly asked question by the
autonomous agents community: “where do goals
come from?”.
Second, it reveals that at least part of the
episodic memory of the agent must be accessible to
emotion and to emotion learning.
Finally, it puts forth some principles for the
design of the affective appraisal system of the agent:
avoid explicit comparisons between the global state
and the agent’s motivators, replace long chains of
rules by single appraisal productions, restrict the
appraisal of the global state to a limited amount of
features of the internal state and the external
environment.
In this paper, we argue that emotion learning
may improve the agent behavior, since emotion
plays fundamental roles at the level of control of the
agent architecture. This amounts to saying that better
control entails more adaptive behavior.
The main contribution of the paper is the
description of several processes by which an agent
may learn emotion. These processes belong to three
major classes: learning affective appraisal rules,
learning new emotion-signals, and learning emotion
responses. These classes of emotion learning are
derived from the model of emotion as a process with
three main components: appraisal, emotion-signal
generation and emotion-response.










Change the features of the
generated emotion-signal
Cognitive or affective?




Learning emotion-responses Learning new responses Cognitive and affective
engines
Learning due to the
emotion-response




Table 1 - Classification of emotion learning processes
The systematic analyses presented in the paper
may be used as a guide for developing more
adaptive agent architectures, based on emotion
learning.
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